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Lukas Haynes and Michael Ignatieff
This paper examines a critical case of Executive Branch leadership during the
creation of the United Nations. Before his death, President Franklin Roosevelt
hoped that the wartime alliance would become the cornerstone of postwar inter-
national security. The U.N. charter, ratified in July 1945, marked the end of the
State Department's four-year effort to reinvent the League of Nations and pro-
mote postwar peace and security. This case study explores the State
Department's public leadership efforts—in the form of a concerted, nationwide
campaign to educate the American people and their leaders in Congress about
the merits of U.S. involvement in the new international organization. 
In its effort to commit the American people to multilateral engagement in the
postwar world, the U.S. government distributed some 2.1 million educational
publications through over four hundred citizen groups. It conducted a nation-
wide series of public meetings, speeches and national radio broadcasts, and cre-
ated the State Department's first public affairs office to monitor public opinion
and to coordinate outreach.
In describing the campaign, the case study addresses a number of important
questions for students of leadership and public policy, including: How did the
State Department respond to specific challenges that it faced throughout the
campaign? How can leaders promote a greater interest in and knowledge about
policy decisions that affect American interests in the world? And how can lead-
ers reach their target audience?
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INTRODUCTION
On July 2, 1945, President Harry S Truman hand-delivered the United Nations (U.N.) Charter to the United
States Senate. He asked the Senate to affirm the legacy of the late Franklin Delano Roosevelt and ratify the
Charter without delay. This was the final step of a four-year, American-led effort to reinvent the League of
Nations and conclude a new international charter for the promotion of postwar peace and security.
Twenty-six years earlier, President Woodrow Wilson had attempted to bring the United States into the
League and convince the Senate to ratify the ambitious League Covenant that was attached to the
Versailles Treaty. Republican opponents of the President, led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, rejected the
treaty and denounced Wilson’s vision for U.S. participation in international organization. Lodge and his
fellow opponents to the League saw inherent dangers in the U.S. leading such an organization and feared
foreign influence over the destiny of the American people. They rejected the costs and commitments of
worldwide responsibilities and resented what they saw as Wilson’s usurpation of executive control over
American foreign policy. Many of them believed that the President was attempting to force commitments
upon the people and Congress without regard for public opinion (Ambrosius, 1987: x).
The United States would never join the League, and the events of the 1930s only confirmed the worst
fears of those who believed it would be a largely ineffective organization. In 1935, Roosevelt remarked,
“The League has become nothing more than a debating society, and a poor one at that” (Roosevelt, 1933:
254-55).
When war broke out in September 1939, American diplomats were generous in their assignment of
blame. According to an official State Department history, the declarations of war by Great Britain and
France were a pivotal moment in U.S. history:
The general war had come as the culmination of an Axis policy of planned aggression...
[T]he facts and the lessons of experience with insecurity between the wars had been but
partly assessed by the American people and the rest of mankind. One instant meaning
of the war, however, was clear: American efforts, the League’s efforts, and all other
efforts to prevent it had utterly failed. To think out the lessons of that experience and
to conceive a way to restore and keep international peace were vital future tasks (U.S.
Dept. of State, 1949:  15).1
Over the next three years, Roosevelt directed the State Department to draft the charter for a new interna-
tional security organization. From 1942-45, teams of diplomats reviewed the League’s failures and draft-
ed the provisions of a new structure to remedy its defects. When a first comprehensive draft had been
completed, U.S. negotiators convened talks with British, Soviet, and Chinese diplomats at Dumbarton
Oaks. They resolved remaining issues of contention over the next five months, and in June 1945 met with
nearly four dozen additional delegations at the San Francisco Conference on International Organization
(U.S. Congress, 1945:  7118-19).
The vision at the heart of the plan was simple. Roosevelt decided that the wartime alliance should become
the cornerstone of postwar international security. He reasoned that if the military power of the United
States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union could be harnessed after the war and directed towards a com-
mon agenda for promoting international security, then the three powers would preside over a new era of
peace and prosperity.2 Roosevelt was also convinced that the essential difference between the League and
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the United Nations would be the United States’ willingness to join and lead. To the commander-in-chief
of the largest military force in the history of the world, continued U.S. engagement was essential to world
peace.
Roosevelt directed his diplomats to negotiate strong provisions for military action to prevent and count-
er international aggression. The U.N. Charter specified strict guidelines for the use of force, including
rules for when and by what means states could take military action to defend national and collective secu-
rity interests.
From the beginning, U.S. officials knew that such provisions would infringe on closely guarded prerog-
atives of national security. They, therefore, provided Congressional leaders with closed-door briefings on
key decisions and forthcoming diplomatic negotiations. Given the concerns of many congressmen and
the contentious nature of certain consultations, U.S. policymakers anticipated serious political objections
during public discussion and Senate debate of the final Charter.
To create a more supportive environment for these debates, the Roosevelt Administration adopted the
broad challenge of convincing the American people and their leaders in Congress that U.S. leadership in
a new United Nations was a vital national interest. In particular, top officials at the State Department
devised strategies to mobilize public support and prevent the Charter from meeting the same fate as
Wilson’s League Covenant.
This paper explores the State Department’s public leadership efforts, defined here as a concerted, nation-
wide campaign to educate the American people and their leaders in Congress about the merits of U.S.
involvement in international organization. In describing this campaign, the study tells a specific story
and raises fundamental questions for students of public policy:
• How can the government’s foreign affairs agencies cultivate greater interest in and
knowledge about policy decisions that affect U.S. interests in the world?
• How can those agencies reach their target audience?
• In devising a political strategy for ratifying treaties, where does the State Department
draw the line between public education and activities that can be construed as
lobbying?
• Should it stifle criticism of Administration policies and proposals?
• How can it reward key allies and important converts to its cause?
The case study also raises a set of important secondary questions. For instance, to what extent should
executive agencies coordinate public education campaigns with special interest groups that may repre-
sent a small minority of public opinion? Might this alienate the minority views in Congress whose sup-
port the Administration might also require? Should executive agencies educate the public about the
processes by which policies are developed in addition to the policies themselves?
The reader might consider how Roosevelt’s outreach campaign approached all of these questions. It may
also be useful to consider how the State Department responded to specific choices and challenges it faced
throughout the campaign. The paper will demonstrate that all of these questions raised difficult choices
for policymakers and created dilemmas that still exist today. Students are encouraged to consider whether
the campaign under examination could be replicated in the future.
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OCTOBER 1944
“Making the State Department an Instrument of the People”
On October 9, 1944, after seven weeks of intense negotiations between U.S., British, and Soviet diplo-
mats, the first U.N. draft charter, entitled the “Dumbarton Oaks Proposals,” was released to the public
(New York Times, 1944; Daily Herald, 1944). The Proposals were the first comprehensive blueprint for an
institution that would replace the League of Nations. They called for an organization composed of a
General Assembly of all member states, a Security Council of five permanent members and six rotating
seats elected by the Assembly, an Economic and Social Council to address the conditions leading to war,
and an International Court of Justice to resolve legal disputes between states (U.S. Dept. of State, 1944).
The Proposals addressed the League of Nations’ principal weak-
ness by providing the organization with the authority and means to
project military power. Replicating the model of the Grand Alliance
command structure, U.N. planners conceived a permanent
Military Staff Committee (MSC) to organize collective action under
the authority of the Security Council and prevent, deter, counter, or
punish international aggression. The MSC was designed to enable
direct and continuous contact among the general staffs of the
Soviet, British, and American military commands (Reynolds &
Hughes, 1976:  26-28).
The Roosevelt Administration’s influence was clear; the Proposals
contained all of the essential provisions of a draft prepared by the United States before Dumbarton Oaks
(Stettinius, 11 Sept. 1944). In October, Roosevelt declared that agreement on the Proposals was a major
U.S. achievement and hailed a future U.N. “with the power to act quickly and decisively to keep the peace
by force” (Rosenman, 1950:  350). After driving the U.N. planning process for almost three years, the time
had come for the more difficult task of winning public approval.
In a book published in late 1944, historian Walter Johnson captured the prevailing public mood:
While many Americans seem convinced of the need for an international organization of
nations with the power to enforce its commitments, many of the same voices that told
America that “it is not our war” in the days before Pearl Harbor are still doing their best
to take America along the road of isolationism once the war is over (Johnson, 1944:  235).
Roosevelt remained deeply concerned about isolationist movements, particularly the virulent strain that
had always sought to block American leadership in international organization. Writing in the National
Record, Robert R. Reynolds summed up the view of staunch isolationists: “I am a thousand times more
isolationist today than I was before we became engaged in this war. But that is my privilege. However, I
prefer to be referred to as an American Firster, or a Nationalist” (Johnson, 1944:  238). The mainstream
influence of isolationists, even towards the end of the war, is evident in the fact that the writer was not
merely a citizen with isolationist views. Reynolds, a Democrat from North Carolina, was chairman of the
Senate’s Military Affairs Committee.
Whether the opponents defined themselves as isolationists, nationalists, or members of the America First
Party, they shared the same worldview. They saw U.S. treaty commitments to international organization
as a dire threat to “American independence.” During the League debates, Miles Poindexter, the outspo-
“The dilemma for State Department
leaders, therefore, was how to
cultivate the public and congres-
sional support that Roosevelt
needed, without appearing to
meddle in domestic politics.”
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ken Senator from Washington state, said that membership in international organizations would require
the American people to “become a party to all the international complications arising from diversity of
race and language and conflict of interests of the various peoples of Asia, Africa, and Europe”
(Ambrosius, 1987:  90-91). It would also require a willingness to use military force. This entailed obliga-
tions that were opposed by Republican and Democratic isolationists alike.
Roosevelt and his relatively inexperienced Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, planned to counter these
arguments with a nationwide campaign to explain why the United States had to remain engaged in the
postwar world and assume a leadership role in the new United Nations. Their first challenge, of course,
was to decide the best means of mounting such a campaign. During the early years of the war, the State
Department had given little attention to public relations and focused instead on the enormous diplomat-
ic challenges abroad. As a result, the public had come to see the Department as a largely opaque institu-
tion engaged in secretive statecraft. In early 1944, with the post-Dumbarton Oaks challenge on the
horizon, the Department took significant steps to improve its outreach efforts with the American public.
In February, the Department established the Division of Public Liaison with a mandate of giving “people
closer insight into the operations of the Department” and to conduct “continuing studies… relating to
public attitudes…on current foreign policy questions” (RDS, Undated A).3
In the context of U.N. planning, the establishing guidelines articulated a revolutionary new goal for an
agency that had never concerned itself with public opinion. It was “to make the Department an instru-
ment of the people.” The Public Liaison Division was, therefore, responsible for reaching out to “all sec-
tions of the nation to discuss with the people everywhere the meaning and limitations of the proposed
U.N. organization and our expectations concerning it” (Hull, 1948:  1711).
Even with such clear goals, senior diplomats had great difficulty deciding how the Department should
meet the challenge of public outreach and education. In fact, they faced a unique dilemma. The State
Department was responsible only for the formulation and implementation of the President’s foreign poli-
cies; it had to be very careful managing issues that commanded strong domestic political constituencies.
As President Wilson had so painfully learned, the question of U.S. participation in international organi-
zation had a long and contentious history in the halls of Congress. Because the U.N. treaty required con-
gressional ratification, the Roosevelt Administration would have to strike a fine balance between
reasonable public education efforts and activities that would appear politically motivated to influence
Congress. The dilemma for State Department leaders, therefore, was how to cultivate the public and con-
gressional support that Roosevelt needed, without appearing to meddle in domestic politics.
The Administration’s approach to this dilemma was a sophisticated one. Rather than waging a direct cam-
paign that might quickly attract the scrutiny of isolationist lawmakers, the State Department began to
identify a wide range of private groups and associations with which to partner. In 1944, Department out-
reach experts observed that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) committed to business, labor, and
religious advocacy had become “a major force in the field of public opinion” during the war. For both eco-
nomic and political reasons, many of these groups had become “entirely, or to a large degree, interested
in the field of foreign affairs.” Stettinius noted that their total membership included tens of millions of
Americans; their influence, amplified by national press coverage, would have “a definite effect on gener-
al public opinion” (RDS, Undated A).
In working with NGOs, the State Department sought to alter the popular image of diplomats as secretive
mandarins conducting sinister business and shielding it from public scrutiny. The Department hired
John S. Dickey, a renowned public relations consultant, to address this very issue. Dickey immediately
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identified the need for greater departmental transparency, increased visibility of diplomatic leaders, and
more frequent interaction among policymakers, NGO leaders, and sympathetic audiences (RDS, 10 July
1943).4 As a first step, Dickey recommended instituting a series of public outreach efforts, including
appearances, speeches, interviews, off-the-record discussions, radio interviews, and the filming of at least
two documentaries on American diplomacy (RDS, 11 Nov. 1943).
Following these recommendations, Dickey was also put in charge of the State Department’s first public
affairs office, which would monitor public opinion and coordinate NGO outreach. The office was
designed to forge relationships with large constituency groups and particularly influential sections of the
population. Such groups included the American Federation of Labor, the American Legion, the
Congregational Churches of America, the Federal Council of Churches, the General Federation of
Women’s Clubs, the Methodist Church, the National League of Women Voters, the United States
Chamber of Commerce, and the Universities Committee on Post War Problems (RDS, May 1944).
Dickey undertook this work with great success through the fall of 1944. As Dumbarton Oaks concluded,
he was well prepared to meet with NGO leaders to discuss ways of winning their support for the proposed
international organization and the Administration’s strategy to sell it. After initial consultations, Dickey
told Stettinius that a large group of NGOs was arranging to meet in New York in October to plan “a coor-
dinated campaign of popular education.” NGO leaders had asked Dickey, however, what the State
Department’s public education strategy would be. In Dickey’s view, the leaders were so supportive of the
State Department’s goals that they did not want to proceed without knowing the plans of his Office of
Public Affairs (RDS, 25 Sept. 1944).
Dickey’s NGO consultations raised a whole new set of choices for State Department leaders.  They had
to decide whether the thrust of public outreach should be undertaken in the weeks immediately follow-
ing Dumbarton Oaks or only after all participating states had signed the Charter at the final drafting con-
ference in San Francisco. Roosevelt was resolved to host this follow-up conference as soon as possible
and, preferably, before the end of 1944. He also planned to submit the Charter to the Senate before the
final surrender had been obtained from Germany.
State Department planners, therefore, had to assume that both the period prior to San Francisco and the
period prior to Senate debate would offer a fairly limited window of opportunity for public outreach
efforts. Dickey also had to decide what form the education campaign should take and how the
Administration could best shape public debate about the Charter. Among the questions he sought to
answer were the following:
• Would Americans be more receptive to U.N. plan before or after all the world’s gov-
ernments had signed the charter?
• If the Department tried to limit discussion of the Proposals before San Francisco,
would political opponents seize the initiative in framing the public debate?
• Would continued secrecy undermine existing public support for international organ-
ization?
• If the Department chose to stimulate interest in the Proposals, could it control the
manner of public debate?
• Should the Department align itself with all large, private associations willing to dis-
cuss the Charter or only those with relatively supportive views?
59
Dickey and his staff spent considerable time sorting out these political and tactical issues and formulat-
ing recommendations to Secretary Stettinius. On October 1, in a confidential memo to the Stettinius,
Dickey offered the following analysis of how the Department should proceed:
The period between the publication of the Dumbarton Oaks results and the formula-
tion of a definitive treaty by a United Nations conference will [determine] whether a
helpful or harmful opinion will be developed on those issues which will be settled in
the treaty. Once the treaty is prepared and submitted for public and Senate approval the
range of useful public debates on issues is greatly narrowed; at that time the issue must
be, so far as we can influence it, “Are you for or against this treaty now?” [emphasis in
original]… .It is inevitable that between the announcement of the Dumbarton Oaks
results and the United Nations conference these issues will be actively debated and
public opinion will either take a set one way or the other or it will get all snarled up
which of itself would be highly unfortunate. It is therefore, to our advantage, to have
these issues clearly understood, and the most favorable public opinions possible estab-
lished on them before [emphasis added] we enter the final negotiations for a definitive
treaty. There is little time so it is necessary…to have a very intensive educational pro-
gram. Under these circumstances one of the most important aids in this task will be
the organized groups which are experienced in and geared to this sort of public educa-
tional work (Dickey, 01 Oct. 1944).
In his memo, Dickey concluded that NGOs supportive of Administration policy should be given maxi-
mum support from the State Department and detailed background guidance on Roosevelt’s diplomatic
and political strategy. After four years of designing the U.N. framework in secrecy, Dickey was proposing
a strategy to use American NGOs as field battalions in a broad campaign to defeat isolationist opponents
and their supporters in Congress.
TAKING THE STRATEGY FORWARD
“Lending All Possible Aid”
Stettinius read Dickey’s recommendations and approved a course of action immediately. The Secretary of
State knew that America’s entry into the U.N. was Roosevelt’s highest priority after defeating the Axis.
He endorsed Dickey’s strategy of giving maximum support to NGO education efforts and approved the
first three tactical steps in that strategy.
First, the State Department would print hundreds of thousands of copies of the Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals and provide them to all large organizations prepared to distribute them. Second, the
Department would deploy senior officials to major NGO conferences so that they could frame the
Proposals in the most positive light. Finally, between releasing the Proposals and convening the San
Francisco conference, the State Department, would adopt a policy “of lending all possible aid to public edu-
cational undertakings on this subject.” Stettinius assigned senior officials to ongoing, off-the-record dis-
cussions with all “responsible and important” organizations involved in this effort (Dickey, 01 Oct. 1944).
Within weeks, diplomats mobilized a formidable citizen army by informing more than 96 national
organizations that the Department would provide “any help” it could render (AAUN, 06 Oct. 1944).5
Some of these organizations—such as the National League of Women Voters, the American Federation
of Labor, and the National Grange—maintained fairly mainstream political positions and remained rela-
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tively neutral on the question of U.S. participation in international organization. Many more represent-
ed a small but vocal minority of advocates for international organization.
One of the more vocal advocacy groups, Americans United for World Organization (AUWO), told
Stettinius that its coalition of 24 organizations had begun “a very extensive political action program by
which they hope[d] to bring about greater Congressional support for effective world organization.”
AUWO was founded in June 1944 as the “only national, militant group of men and women formed to
urge political action upon members of Congress in behalf of world organization” (RDS, 04 Oct. 1944).6
The State Department was not only prepared to support such organizations in countering isolationist
arguments, but it did so enthusiastically. On October 16, Stettinius convened an off-the-record
Washington planning session with the leaders of some 100 organizations that supported the
Administration’s policy.7 AUWO Chairman Ernest Hopkins later wrote to Stettinius about the NGO
response to this highly public and pro-active approach:
There can be no overestimating the appreciation which they had….Enthusiasm was 
almost unbounded among the representatives of the different organizations….
Again and again men came to me expressing appreciation for the attitude of the 
Department….Precedent is a heavy hand in departments of government, and I can well
understand the difficulties which had to be overcome by those of you who were inter-
ested in this conference (Stettinius, 14 Oct. 1944).
In fact, Stettinius’s primary challenge was approving a public outreach strategy with no precedent at all. As one
historian observed, the AUWO response shows the importance of this “unprecedented and carefully planned
action by the Department of State, and suggests the value of the new approach to the public” (Robins, 1960:  64).
The Department convened four additional strategy meetings between late October and Christmas 1944.8
Teams of diplomats fanned out as part of the national campaign to generate support for the
Administration’s U.N. policy. In the first two weeks of the campaign, more than 60 Department repre-
sentatives met with key groups, distributed printed materials, and helped communities train their own
speaker panels (RDS, 22 Nov. 1944).
The early success of this campaign created its own momentum. Between October 1944 and June 1945,
the State Department convened 335 separate meetings with NGO leaders in every major population cen-
ter of the country (RDS, Undated B).9 This list of selected meetings demonstrates the broad nature of the
Administration’s outreach effort:
Meeting with leading magazine editors and writers, New York: December 8, 1944
Meeting with regional school principals, Baltimore: December 21, 1944
Briefing at national conference of mayors, Miami: January 2, 1945
Conference of labor leaders, Washington, D.C.: March 27, 1945
Meeting with national religious leaders, Washington, D.C.: April 3, 1945
Meeting with business leaders, New York: April 11, 1945 
(RDS, Undated B).
These private meetings, which took advantage of private sector contacts and focused on NGO leaders,
served several important purposes. First, they were the most efficient means of explaining the State
Department’s somewhat technical reasoning behind certain provisions of the U.N. proposals. Second,
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they gave Department officials an opportunity to hear the particular views of individuals and organiza-
tions on whom the Department would rely for timely information-sharing and effective rebuttal of oppos-
ing arguments. Third, the meetings were an opportunity to work out misunderstandings and differences
of opinion that might undermine public enthusiasm.
The private meetings gradually led to more frequent public-speaking activities. Historically, however, public
speeches had not been a popular tool for public diplomacy. Previous administrations had, of course, made
frequent use of presidential statements on foreign policy and Cabinet-level statements to the press. Before
1944, however, speeches by senior State Department officials were not common. In fact, most speeches were
not public addresses at all. Over half of the engagements arranged by the State Department in October 1944
were off-the-record.
The Department chose not to reach the entire population directly. It focused
its efforts on NGO leaders and opinion-shapers, who, in turn, were expect-
ed to tailor their arguments and wield a powerful influence on specific
groups and communities. It also gave critical, isolationist media outlets
fewer official government statements to parse and criticize.
There were occasional exceptions. Roosevelt and Stettinius used the bully pulpit to launch “Operation
Soapbox” on Columbus Day, 1944; they broadcast their remarks on international organization to the
entire nation by radio. The concerted use of radio, however, was not undertaken until the beginning of
1945. Even then, the great majority of foreign policy addresses were not made available to broadcasters,
but rather pitched to more limited audiences.
One reason for this early caution was the Administration’s lack of public polling data to assess main-
stream public opinion. Polling methods were still fairly primitive in 1944, and Roosevelt had very little
idea how the average constituent would respond to a major public presentation on international organi-
zation. All he knew, from witnessing President Wilson’s experience, was that he only had one opportu-
nity to make his public sale. As one historian wrote, it was “the most momentous of all American foreign
policy projects”—the building of an international political organization in which the United States would
play a major part (Edel, 1979:  187).
OPPOSIT ION,  D ISSENT,  AND DISINFORMATION
The “Dumbarton Hoax”
In order to understand that State Department leaders faced a major persuasive challenge, one need only
glance at the widely divergent views of NGOs and media commentators across the political spectrum.
Mainstream editorial commentary tended to support the proposals while focusing on specific parts of the
plan. State Department surveys revealed that the veto ranked first among the most contentious issues,
with discussion of whether Congress should approve in each specific case the use of military forces plac-
ing second. There was also considerable interest in the protections afforded to small states, the status of
existing regional security arrangements (including the Monroe Doctrine), and the prospect of U.S. acces-
sion to the organization only after a peace settlement had been reached.
Most criticism was intended to be helpful, and State Department public opinion analysts found plenty of
encouragement to continue their efforts. In their reading of public attitudes, three points were consis-
tently emphasized: The public’s appreciation of wide-scale dissemination of the U.N. plan; an urgent
“ Historically, however, public
speeches had not been a popular
tool for public diplomacy.”
desire to establish the organization prior to the final peace settlements; and continued support for the
Administration’s efforts to ensure prompt Senate debate and ratification (RDS, 21 Oct. 1944).
Expectedly, strident criticism came from isolationist-nationalist quarters, broadcasting through the
McCormick-Patterson press, which owned the Chicago Tribune and the New York Daily News. Writing in
the Tribune on behalf of the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, Captain John Trevor described the
“grave peril” posed to the country if it should “give power over” to “any international body.” He said that
the Dumbarton Oaks plan “repudiated basic principles of this country” and demanded that Congress
resist. Trevor’s comments, and those like it, were consistent themes in the pages of both newspapers and
the Congressional Record during this period.
A second type of general criticism came from “idealists” and “world federalists”—such as Grenville Clark,
Ely Culbertson, and the editors of The New Yorker. For these influential critics, plans to improve upon the
League of Nations failed to go far enough towards world disarmament and the creation of a new frame-
work for international society that was based on more egalitarian structures.
The heaviest opposition, however, came from those who believed that the process of drafting the U.N.
plan itself was “undemocratic,” privileging the interests of the Great Powers and catering to on-going
“power politics” in Europe. Among this group were Norman Thomas, members of the Post-War World
Council, and John Foster Dulles, adviser to 1944 Republican presidential candidate Thomas Dewey (RDS,
17 Nov. 1944). In what was seen as “political warfare,” Dulles criticized “Washington aloofness” about
Soviet policies in Greece and Poland, insinuating that Roosevelt was prepared to abandon a principled
approach to postwar European order in order to get the U.N. built.
In December 1944, the Christian Science Monitor issued an editorial that was typical of the period, argu-
ing that “The Dumbarton Oaks world security treaty is going to have tough going” in the Senate, because
of the “mood of sour, cynical, disillusionment which recent inter-Allied disputes have produced.” The
newspaper named 23 senators, six “die-hard isolationists,” and six others “almost certain” to vote against
any strong international organization that “seemed to lend American prestige to the new spheres of influ-
ence” being carved out by Churchill and Stalin.
By mid-winter 1945, events in the European theatre led State Department officials to conclude that such
criticism would fuel opposition to the plan. Between late November and January, conditions on the war
front deteriorated rapidly. The Battle of the Bulge, the last desperate thrust of the Nazi armies, battered
the Allies. In Eastern Europe, the satellites fell, as Soviet troops penetrated west and south. The British-
Soviet dispute over Poland continued to evoke great concern in Washington.
Throughout this period, the Roosevelt Administration felt increasing pressure to stifle criticism of the
Dumbarton Oaks plan, while many NGO partners felt insufficient support in generating debate. In
January, Leland Goodrich, Director of the World Peace Foundation, commented to Stettinius that, “While
the Department says the Proposals are open to free discussion and criticism, that is not quite the case.”
Comments like this demonstrated that, if it insisted on unqualified support, the Administration would
face a great deal of antagonism. Another danger lay in the inference that NGOs might draw from such a
posture: That further discussion of the plans was pointless. The public might also conclude that state-
ments welcoming wide discussion were disingenuous. The Administration feared that a disillusioned cit-
izenry might rally to the call of the Chicago Tribune, which was to “Reject the ‘Dumbarton Hoax.’”
62
W
O
R
K
IN
G
 P
A
P
E
R
S
  
 C
E
N
T
E
R
 F
O
R
 P
U
B
L
IC
 L
E
A
D
E
R
S
H
IP
It is clear that Stettinius and senior staff members appreciated these dangers. An important strategy
memo advised Stettinius to avoid the suggestion “of shutting off discussion or wanting organizations to
rubber stamp our activity” (Dickey, 01 Oct. 1944). From this point forward, there is no evidence of State
Department officials asking NGOs to restrict public discussion or refrain from qualifying their support.
Of course, the same officials were never enthusiastic
about public opposition to the U.N. proposals. They
simply created as many opportunities as they could to
convince the public that their decisions were in the
nation’s best interests. From October 1944 until April
1945, outreach officers turned down few opportunities
to meet with groups of every variety. Appendix B indi-
cates that no important category was overlooked.
The same variety is characteristic of the more than 300 speaking engagements filled by officers of the
State Department during the seven-month campaign. Groups concerned primarily with international
relations competed for the greatest number of Department speakers; educational institutions were a close
second. Organized labor, agriculture, and religious associations also played an important role. But these
three groups were of far less priority than the fourth major interest group:  Business. Regional chambers
of commerce and leading corporate representatives played a vitally important role in sponsoring advoca-
cy events and hosting Administration officials.
The record suggests that State Department leaders sought out well-educated audiences and groups with
whom they already enjoyed personal or professional relationships. The chief requirements for high-level
outreach were as follows: (1) The would-be sponsor’s sincere desire for authoritative information and
greater understanding; (2) an audience of “appropriate importance,” in terms of either numbers or influ-
ence; and (3) the availability of outreach officials.
The State Department campaign always had the full support of the White House; the only real constraint
on Departmental outreach was a limited number of qualified personnel. The Department endorsed some
500 speaking engagements during the seven-month period between October and April 1945, compared
with 57 speeches given in the first six months of 1944. It seems extraordinary that the 500-event cam-
paign was undertaken with only a tiny increase in Department personnel.
Given the limited pool of available speakers, the State Department was in no position to accept all invita-
tions and had to reject almost 200 in the first four months of the campaign. However, the distribution of
agreed appearances reflects the Department’s shrewd use of limited resources. Of the total number of
appearances between October and April, more than two-thirds were in states in the Northeast and mid-
Atlantic regions. Almost 80% of those appearances occurred in cities of over 100,000 people. The
Department rarely visited smaller cities more than once, while more than half of the larger cities had
return engagements. Some towns with populations of less than 10,000 received more than their share of
speakers; many of these small communities were home to colleges or universities.
63
“ The record suggests that State Department
leaders sought out well-educated audiences
and groups with whom they already enjoyed
personal or professional relationships.”
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THE PRINT CAMPAIGN
“A Blizzard of Paper”
While Operation Soapbox swept across the country, a complementary program emerged as the larger part
of a two-front campaign. As officials took to the streets, they carried a great deal of paper with them. The
State Department’s Public Affairs Office published four distinct publications describing the Dumbarton
Oaks plan and the reasons for U.S. participation in international organization. The official publications
included a schematic chart of the U.N. plan, an eight-page flier featuring answers to “frequently asked
questions,” and a printed text of the entire document. For NGOs that wanted more detailed information,
the Department also prepared study guides and discussion outlines.
Early distributors of these publications included the national headquarters of the Young Men’s Christian
Association, the National Council for Social Studies, and the National Education Association. With aid
from the State Department, articles were also prepared for publication by the National Association of
Secondary School Principals, the Junior League, the Young Women’s Christian Association, Kiwanis, and
the National Farmer’s Union (whose magazine alone circulated some 800,000 copies).
In order to ensure that small communities would not be overlooked, the White House asked the Office
of War Information (OWI) to help the State Department reach rural newspapers. Press summaries
announcing the merits of international organization were sent to some 9,000 weekly newspapers and
over 1,000 small town dailies (RDS, 22 Nov. 1944). Using a Department draft, OWI prepared 2,200 mats
for rural newspapers with an estimated circulation of close to 3 million subscribers. Another 12 million
readers were targeted through the labor press.
Over the last six months of the education campaign, the Roosevelt Administration targeted nearly 20 mil-
lion Americans for Dumbarton Oaks information handouts. Almost 2.2 million official State Department
publications were distributed to public and private groups throughout the country.10 Seven national
organizations distributed more than 50,000 publications apiece, including the League of Women Voters,
the Federal Council of Churches, and the Congress of Industrial Organizations.
Roosevelt also ordered other executive agencies to assist diplomats in papering the country with pro-U.N.
materials. The Department of Agriculture offered the assistance of its Extension Service, the Office of
Education covered schools and libraries, the Federal Security Agency took care of all units of the United
Service Organizations, and the OWI sent the Dumbarton Oaks wall chart to airline and bus terminals,
radio stations, banks, shipyards, war plants, U.S. employment offices, and other public venues where peo-
ple concentrated in large numbers. In all, executive agencies distributed an additional 400,000 copies of
State Department publications. One veteran of this publication blitz said, “It was a virtual blizzard of
paper related to Dumbarton Oaks and over time Roosevelt hoped it would eventually float down and the
merits of international organization would soak into every corner of the country” (Cheever, 1995).
After the initial run, large NGOs followed the State Department’s lead and published documents with
identical or similar formats. The National League of Women Voters published a pamphlet entitled
“Opening Gun of Campaign for Support of United Nations Organization,” which included an eight-page
“question and answer” brochure to accompany the Dumbarton Oaks text. These were mailed to some
600 local leagues throughout the country to encourage household discussion.
Life magazine published an attractive wall-chart of the Proposals and received 46,000 orders in the
month thereafter. As these publications reached broad segments of the American public, follow-on edu-
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cational efforts were launched with the State Department’s full support. Senior officials sought to clarify
key issues and did so by enlisting professional organizations—such as the American Legion, the
American Bar Association, and the American Association for University Women. In each case, national
organizations distributed State Department materials through local chapters and provided teaching
guides to stimulate discussion (RDS, Undated C).
The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP) was probably the most significant State
Department ally in these efforts. CSOP distributed tens of thousands of Dumbarton Oaks pamphlets to
such organizations as the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, the National Congress of Parents and
Teachers, and the American Jewish Congress. 
WORKING WITH CONGRESS
“A Turning Point”
With the public fully informed and increasingly mobilized, the Administration turned to the challenge of
cultivating support in Congress. It was there that Woodrow Wilson’s attempts to sell the League had failed
most egregiously. Wilson had stubbornly refused to acknowledge the power of the U.S. Senate to rein in
the President’s most ambitious instincts on foreign policy. Wilson had long regarded the presidential
power to negotiate treaties as “very absolute” and one that “virtually committed” the Senate to approval
(Ambrosius, 1987:  4). As one historian has noted, “From 1919-20, Republican senators refused to play
the role assigned to them. Despite modest efforts to influence them through management of public opin-
ion…[Wilson] lost the treaty fight. The Senate demonstrated that the president’s power to control
American foreign relations was less absolute than Wilson thought” (Ambrosius, 1987:  4).
Roosevelt was a much shrewder politician in his relations with the Congress. In December 1944, he
authorized the creation of a new State Department position, the Assistant Secretary of State for
Congressional Relations, and he promoted Dean Acheson to occupy it. The appointment of an Assistant
Secretary with special responsibility for liaising with Congress sent a strong signal to lawmakers about
the Administration’s commitment to working together on foreign affairs. It replaced periodic contacts
with a permanent channel for consultation and created a central clearinghouse (still in place today) for
the efficient administration of routine diplomatic business on Capitol Hill.
The practical challenge of securing Republican support for U.N. plans re-emerged in the weeks immedi-
ately following Acheson’s appointment. On January 10, the notorious Michigan isolationist, Senator
Arthur Vandenberg, finally reported his position on the Dumbarton Oaks plans, which had circulated for
three months. Although the Senator offered very principled criticism of the extraordinary privileges
reserved to the Great Powers, his statement gave measured support to U.N. plans and provided an enor-
mous opportunity to the Administration. The challenge now became one of forging a bipartisan coalition
by capturing Vandenberg’s moderate colleagues and drawing on the public swell of support for the U.N.
Within two days, Acheson took the decisive step of engineering a return gesture. A bipartisan foreign pol-
icy conference was called for January 12, with Vandenberg among the Republicans invited to the White
House for privileged discussions with the President. This conference was followed by diligent State
Department diplomacy on Capitol Hill, which produced further progress. On January 23, all of the newly
elected members of the Senate signed a letter promising the President full support for his U.N. program.
Given the combination of Republican and Democratic signatures on the letter, the Administration
became even more assertive. The White House quickly rolled the letter out in a January 24 press release
to demonstrate bipartisan support for U.N. planning.
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The response to this press release was still more encouraging. Within 24 hours, the newly elected
Democrats of the House sent to the White House a similar pledge of cooperation with 59 signatures
appended. The House Republican Caucus held out the longest, but, on February 28, 17 of the Party’s
freshmen representatives signed a carefully worded letter of support.
The White House then produced the pièce de résistance. To lock in Republican support for the final stages
of U.N. planning, Roosevelt appointed a high-profile, bipartisan delegation to represent the United States
at the conference to revise the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and conclude the final U.N. Charter. Mindful
of President Wilson’s battles with Congress, the list included the
two most senior figures from both parties on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Senators Tom Connally and Arthur
Vandenberg. Roosevelt did what could only have seemed
unimaginable to isolationist opponents of the day: The
President reached out to the man who might possibly represent
the greatest threat to his vision and signed him onto his team.
In doing so, Roosevelt greatly diminished the chances of facing
his own Henry Cabot Lodge.
The delegation also included both parties’ leaders of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Representatives Hal Bloom and Charles Eaton. It balanced a military officer and former governor, Harold
Stassen, with a prominent woman, Virginia Gildersleeve, the Dean of Barnard College. In a final act of
bipartisan outreach, Roosevelt approved the appointment of John Foster Dulles as Special Adviser to the
delegation.
In February, the President returned from the Yalta summit, where he had finally struck an agreement
with Stalin on the veto, and announced that the long-delayed spring conference would now be convened
in April 1945. At Yalta, American, Soviet, and British diplomats worked out the remaining details of the
United Nations conference. Invitations would be issued in the name of the five future permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council. Roosevelt also approved Stettinius’s idea to hold the conference in San
Francisco.
Upon his return from Yalta, Roosevelt reported to Congress that the summit marked “a turning point” in
international relations. The President returned to the bully pulpit one last time and used a joint session
of Congress to tell the American people that they would soon face a stark choice over whether to join and
lead a new international organization. The President framed the issue in the bold language of a politician
convinced of final victory. The Senate’s fateful decision, said Roosevelt, would:
…[d]etermine the fate of the United States—and of the world—for generations to come.
There can be no middle ground here. We shall have to take the responsibility for world
collaboration or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict….
The Crimean conference ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the
exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other
expedients that have been tried for centuries—and have always failed. We propose to
substitute for all these a universal organization which all peace-loving nations will
finally have a chance to join (Rosenman, 1950 (13):  573; 585-586).
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“The President reached out to the
man who might possibly represent
the greatest threat to his vision 
and signed him onto his team.”
67
M
O
B
IL
IZ
IN
G
 P
U
B
L
IC
 S
U
P
P
O
R
T
 F
O
R
 T
H
E
 U
N
IT
E
D
 N
A
T
IO
N
S
F INAL PHASE OF  THE CAMPAIGN
“Main Street and Dumbarton Oaks”
Even after the government had mobilized an army of NGOs, educated public opinion, and secured a
bipartisan coalition within Congress, the Administration redoubled its efforts in the final three months
before San Francisco. In March, Roosevelt allocated additional funds to meet the costs of publicizing and
disseminating information related to U.S. aims at the conference.
State Department presses geared up publication once again, and officials held an increasing number of
public engagements during the spring. Perhaps more important than the speaker and print campaign,
the State Department took to the nation’s radio airwaves. Press releases and audio speech transcripts
were widely distributed to radio stations during the late winter. In February, Assistant Secretaries of State
Archibald MacLeish and Dean Acheson, kicked off a Saturday evening radio program with the National
Broadcasting Corporation (NBC); the programs continued each Saturday thereafter until San Francisco
opened.
The content of these broadcasts echoed the thrust of the Administration’s policy during this period.
Department leaders stressed the primary responsibility of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United
States for prosecuting the war and, therefore, organizing the peace. They also emphasized the importance
of diplomatic and humanitarian efforts by all states to build a better postwar world and the need for con-
tinued public support to make the promise of international organization a reality.
While Roosevelt and Stettinius had forged agreements at Yalta, a program entitled “Main Street and
Dumbarton Oaks” echoed the Administration’s home-front peace aims. The radio series gradually
focused discussions on particular elements of international cooperation. State Department leaders also
endeavored to address remaining opposition and satisfy those who maintained doubts. To do this, they
employed a shrewd public relations ploy; senior officials raised questions that appeared most worrisome
to the public, occasionally identifying them as “favorite mailbag questions” (RDS, 21 Feb. 1945).
For example, the Department told those who doubted that the U.N. would be any more effective than the
League of Nations that there would no longer be a “unanimity rule” for military action and that the U.N.
would be provided armed forces to enforce its resolutions. Questioners who feared for smaller nations’
rights were told of member-state equality in the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.
Subsequent programs dealt with topics such as “World Trade and World Peace” and “It’s Your State
Department.”
Even in the absence of contemporary polling technology, the Administration went to great lengths to
gauge the impact of the combined speaker, print, and radio campaigns. State Department records esti-
mate that “Building the Peace” broadcasts reached an unprecedented audience of 10-15 million listeners. 
To emphasize bipartisan unity, members of the San Francisco delegation were also sought out by the
major radio networks; and Stettinius actively encouraged their participation. Virginia Gildersleeve
worked with the Mutual Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), and Senator Connally participated in at least
one on-air “Town Meeting” for the American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC).
Washington also reached out to Hollywood, which was more than eager to produce optimistic pictures
after four and a half years of war. The State Department, OWI, and Hollywood’s War Activities Committee
produced a 15-minute documentary on U.N. planning entitled “Watch Tower Over Tomorrow.” This coop-
erative venture of the Hollywood Screen Directors Guild was distributed in late March, and the film was
68
W
O
R
K
IN
G
 P
A
P
E
R
S
  
 C
E
N
T
E
R
 F
O
R
 P
U
B
L
IC
 L
E
A
D
E
R
S
H
IP
sent to over 16,000 theatres with a strongly worded note from industry officials: “I know you will do every-
thing humanly possible to get maximum exhibition by playing it at every performance and stimulating pub-
lic interest and attendance” (RDS, March 1945). The movie-going public was also primed by a constant
flow of newsreels previewing the San Francisco conference.
The impact of the San Francisco campaign is as difficult to measure as it is easy to quantify. For example,
it is known that a minimum of 3-5 million pieces of literature found their way to individuals throughout
the country. It is equally certain that articles in newspapers and magazines were circulated among at least
10-20 million potential readers. It is estimated that another 15-20 million viewers saw film and newsreel
clips intended to increase public support. The mass media coverage was so complete that an untold num-
ber of people even had adverse reactions. One newspaper editorialist complained that all he saw “at the
newsreels was Secretary Stettinius explaining Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco” (New York Daily News,
01 March 1945).
The vast majority of communities responded in more positive ways. The final San Francisco push culmi-
nated in a national Dumbarton Oaks Week. During the week of April 17, 1945, local NGO branches through-
out the country sponsored community education events—such as mass meetings, rallies, radio forums,
window displays, parades, and other special events. To kick off the week, a consortium of NGOs bought
evening airtime on the MBC radio network. The broadcast was inspired by the State Department series and
featured a radio dramatization written by the acclaimed Norman Rosten of the Writers War Board.
To reach school children, the National Education Association sent a letter to 30,000 school principals and
superintendents urging a weeklong focus of study on plans for international organization. Special school
assemblies were called for the morning of April 25, the day the San Francisco conference was scheduled
to open, and the Federal Council of Churches called upon “the entire nation to hold special services on
Sunday, April 22.”
PUBLIC EDUCATION OR “NATION-WIDE PROPAGANDA”?
The culmination of this extraordinary, government-led campaign had a profound effect on public opin-
ion. One San Francisco veteran described the national mood as “nothing less than euphoric.” One NGO
leader summed up the public mood in a memo to his colleagues throughout the country: “The San
Francisco Conference may go down in history as the greatest event since the Constitutional Convention
of 1787. Make sure that our delegation goes to San Francisco confident that the support of the American
people is with them in the setting up of a United Nations Organization” (RDS, 29 March 1945).
The “delegation” in question was an NGO group that the State Department had rewarded for its efforts
by accrediting them official consulting status at San Francisco. To acknowledge NGO partnership
throughout the seven-month campaign, the State Department had convinced the White House to invite
a representative group and designate them as observers and informal advisers to the U.S. delegation.11
Of course, for all the many campaign allies that were rewarded, the Administration had plenty of detrac-
tors. When the question of “Dumbarton Oaks propaganda” was raised in a spring meeting of the Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee, State Department officials testified that their campaign was merely to dis-
seminate public facts and not to “sell” the concept of international organization.
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Administration critics like Republican Senator Robert Taft did not attack “the purposes” of the
Dumbarton Oaks plan directly, but they did take issue with “the deliberate policy of nation-wide propa-
ganda adopted by the State Department and the Treasury with relation to these measures” (U.S.
Congress, 1945:  4125). Taft even suggested that the allocation of public funds for such products as the
Dumbarton Oaks publications, the film, and the radio programs violated federal law, as they were intend-
ed to influence the Congress contrary to legislation prohibiting expenditures made with this intent
(United States Code, 1946). State Department lawyers disagreed, but Taft stopped short of demanding an
investigation or proposing a resolution to censure the Department.
There is little evidence in media coverage of the period to suggest that
the public regarded the Administration’s campaign as propaganda.
Presumably, most people consumed the available information and
formed opinions accordingly. However, the results of the
Administration’s efforts were only too clear. By the time San Francisco
opened, State Department samples of public opinion showed that an
astounding 60% of the surveyed public had heard or read about the
proposals for international organization.
More significant still, 81% of the polled population had answered “yes” to the question: “Do you think the
United States should join a world organization with police power to maintain world peace?” Of the “yes”
responses, a shocking 83% thought it was “very important” for the U.S. to join (RDS, 19 June – 21 July
1945; 16-30 June 1945: 28-74; Undated D).
POSTSCRIPT
In the end, the Roosevelt Administration’s campaign was a resounding success. The American public
welcomed 50 national delegations to San Francisco and applauded the final product—a United Nations
Charter, revised in minor respects, but containing the basic elements of the Dumbarton Oaks plan, which
they had come to know so well.
When the San Francisco Conference ended on June 26, 1945, members of the U.S. delegation wasted no
time making their case to the public. In New York, John Foster Dulles told reporters that, before San
Francisco, many Americans supported the United Nations as a “matter of duty.” With full knowledge of
the Charter’s contents, they now wanted to join as a “matter of choice.” Dulles revised his earlier views
and now said that the Charter was “a people’s document” and the product of a democratic process. In
Minnesota, Commander Stassen told a group in St. Paul that the Charter was no less than a “bridgehead
on the shores of peace.” Senator Vandenberg reiterated his pledge to support prompt ratification “with all
the resources at his command.” Senator Connally promised that the Senate would ratify the Charter with-
out delay; he cautioned the press, however, not to raise overly high expectations for instant action.
Despite Connally’s cautious optimism, all signs pointed to overwhelming support and a desire for
prompt action. A poll by the Associated Press, taken just after San Francisco, indicated that 52 senators
were ready to ratify the Charter; none of the 75 senators interviewed expressed any opposition (RDS, 19
June – 21 July 1945; 16-30 June 1945:  28-74; Undated D).
The efforts of the Administration’s nine-month campaign were bearing their final fruit. In response to
San Francisco, the State Department received letters from the public at a rate of 20,000 per week. As San
“ There is little evidence in
media coverage of the period
to suggest that the public
regarded the Administration’s
campaign as propaganda.”
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Francisco ended, the Senate was pressed to ratify by the Federal Churches of Christ in America (an organ-
ization of twenty-five Protestant denominations representing some 25 million members), the Church
Peace Union, the National Peace Conference, Americans United for World Organization, Americans
Associated for the United Nations, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Commission to
Study the Organization of Peace, and the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, among others (RDS, 19 June –
21 July 1945:  66-74).
It should be emphasized that the responsiveness of civil society to this campaign was not a limited blip
on the government’s radar. According to one social historian, “After the United States signed the Charter,
no school or club program was complete without at least one United Nations or world affairs event. The
conclusion seems clear. The Dumbarton Oaks era initiated wide-scale and continuing public considera-
tion of the problems of world affairs and American foreign policy” (Robins, 1960:  97). One week after
San Francisco, Truman delivered the Charter to the Senate and asked its members to affirm the legacy of
Franklin Roosevelt, who had died on April 12, 1945. After a short period of cordial debate, the Senate
approved the U.N. Charter by a vote of 89-2 (U.S. Dept. of State, 1945:  1). An overwhelming public major-
ity had responded to Roosevelt’s vision, and the long effort he described as his “crowning achievement”
was now complete. When Truman signed the act of U.S. ratification, he turned a new page in the histo-
ry of American foreign policy: The United States had finally agreed to take its place at the table of nations.
Even though Roosevelt did not live to enjoy this victory, he had clearly succeeded where Woodrow Wilson,
one of the most popular presidents in history, had failed. Roosevelt had broken a pattern of U.S. disen-
gagement from world affairs following the end of major conflicts. He had also convinced the American
people to accept permanent responsibility for a leading role in international efforts in hopes of main-
taining global peace and security.
Roosevelt’s success cannot be attributed to any single factor. The American public was similarly exhaust-
ed and wary at the end of both world wars. Wilson and Roosevelt shared the same passion and conviction
for bringing about international organization; and both waged vigorous, personal campaigns to sell their
visions to the people. As well, in each case, the presidents had to battle latent isolationist sentiment and
reasonable objections to treaty language. However, there is no evidence that substantial differences
between the Covenant and the Charter account for the converse outcomes. What, then, might account for
one president’s success and the other’s failure?
Roosevelt’s first advantage was his ability to declare that the League had failed without U.S. participation
and to convince the American people that the U.S. would have to play a greater role in the postwar set-
tlement. However, he also had to overcome 20 years of popular disdain for the League and the very real
weaknesses of the organization. It did not take long for Roosevelt to conclude that the League’s reputa-
tion was beyond resurrection and that a new institution would need to be built. That effort required a
whole new campaign to inspire the public’s imagination about the future, to validate the public’s disgust
for war, and to offer the American people a vision of postwar order for which their representatives in
Congress could vote.
For Roosevelt, who had served as Navy Secretary during World War I, there was no hope for world peace
without committing the United States to aggressive policing beyond its borders. As President, he over-
saw the projection of U.S. military power into every corner of the world, and he believed that the promo-
tion of international security would require maintaining global U.S. military capabilities after the war. In
Roosevelt’s view, the Security Council would give the U.S. a legal framework for maintaining a large
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peacetime military and intervening in defense of global,
strategic interests that he considered synonymous with the
interests of world peace.
In essence, Roosevelt made American entry into the United
Nations a national referendum on the postwar posture of the
United States and its willingness to prevent World War III.
Roosevelt understood well that this was not simply a deci-
sion that could be made by executive prerogative, as Wilson had argued, but a political commitment that
required public debate and pressure on Congress. His brilliance was to inspire the State Department’s
campaign at precisely the right moment in time—as an exhausting war ground to a conclusion, but before
postwar disputes might alienate the people against continued engagement with Europe. In so doing,
Roosevelt managed to capture the public’s imagination and create a “euphoric” ideological movement
that swept along everyone in its path.
As has been argued, this movement was not the result of a single speech or even a series of government
initiatives. It was the successful culmination of a nation-wide campaign of government outreach, public
education, and mediated debate about the merits of joining the United Nations and playing a leadership
role in the new organization.
Roosevelt’s success obviously required strong, decisive leadership, a genuine willingness to work with
Congress, and an organized and effective bureaucracy backed by a generous expenditure of resources.
But the essential difference between success and failure was State Department leadership and the unique
partnerships it brokered.
Stettinius’s Department clearly benefited from steady support from the White House and the cooperation
of other executive agencies. Yet the wisdom of his approach was to forge a sustained partnership with the
strongest institutions of American civil society: A network of private, voluntary associations that con-
nected with the diverse interests and needs of the entire citizenry. This partnership should be seen as the
most innovative aspect of a long-forgotten historical case. The continued existence and vibrant member-
ship of many of these associations should stimulate new thinking about the prospect for new public-pri-
vate partnerships to interest, educate, and mobilize citizens in support of U.S. foreign policy.
The history of America’s public diplomacy is a checkered one. Yet, as the U.S. contemplates the challenge
of a new international era and unprecedented commitments overseas, students of public policy should
take note of the Roosevelt Administration’s extraordinary leadership efforts and learn from its experience
of reaching out to the American people.
“ The essential difference between
success and failure was 
State Department leadership and the
unique partnerships it brokered.”
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APPENDIX A
Eighteen Private Organizations that Collaborated Under the Umbrella of Americans United for World Organization
(Americans United had active local or state organizations or affiliates in 31 states)
APPENDIX B
Select List of Nongovernmental Organizations Represented at October 1944 Meeting with Officials of the Department of State
American Veterans Committee
Catholic Association for International Peace
Church Conference on International Economic Union
Church Peace Union
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace
Committee for National Morale
Council for Social Action
Federal Union
Food for Freedom
Freedom House
Friends of Democracy
League for Fair Play
Non-Partisan Council to Win the Peace
Southern Council on International Relations
Union for Democratic Action
Women’s Action Committee for Victory and Lasting Peace
World Alliance for International Friendship Through Churches
World Citizen Movement
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences
American Association of Advertising Agencies
American Association of University Women
American Bankers Association
American Bar Association
American Council on Education
American Farm Bureau Federation
American Federation of Labor
American Friends Service Committee
American Jewish Committee 
American Legion American Legion 
Auxiliary American Library Association 
Advertising Agencies American 
Society of International Law 
American Unitarian Association 
American Veterans Committee 
Americans United for World Organization 
Brookings Institution 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
Catholic Association for International Peace
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 
Church Peace Union
Citizens Conference on International EconomicUnion
Cleveland Council on World Affairs
Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace
Common Council on American Unity
Congregational Churches
Congress of Industrial Organizations
Council for Democracy
Daughters of the American Revolution
Disabled American Veterans
East and West Association
Federal Union
Food for Freedom
Foreign Missions Conference of North America
Foreign Policy Association
Friends Peace Committee General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church
General Federation of Women’s Clubs 
Institute for International Education
Institute of Pacific Relations 
Junior League of America Kiwanis International
Lawyers Guild
League for Fair Play
League of Nations Association
Lions International
Methodist Church-Women's Division
Military Order of the Purple Heart
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
National Association of Manufacturers
National Catholic Welfare Conference
National Conference of Christians and Jews 
National Council of Catholic Women
National Council of Farmer Cooperatives
National Council of Jewish Women
National Council of Negro Women
National Council of Protestant Episcopal Churches
National Education Association
National Federation of Business and Professional 
Women’s Clubs
National Foreign Trade Council
APPENDIX C
Types of Private Organizations Represented at October 16, 1944 Meeting with the State Department
(354 Organizations Total)
(Compiled from records of the State Department Division of Public Liaison, Fall 1944)
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National Grange
National League of Women Voters
National Parent and Teachers Commerce Association
National Peace Conference
National Small Business Men’s Association
Non-Partisan Council to Win the Peace
Northern Baptist Convention
Railroad Brotherhoods of America 
Rotary International
Southern Baptist Convention
Southern Council in International Relations
Synagogue Council of America Town Hall, Inc.
Twentieth Century Fund
Union for Democratic Action
United Christian Council on Democracy
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
U.S. Conference of Mayors 
U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce
U.S. Student Assembly
Universities Committee on Post-War Problems 
Urban League
Veterans of Foreign Wars
War Activities Committee of  the Motion Picture Industry
Western Policy Association Women's Action Committee
Woodrow Wilson Foundation
World Federalists
World Government Association
World Peace Foundation
Young Men's Christian Association
Twentieth Century Fund Association
Young Women's Christian Association
Young Women's Hebrew Association
Organizations with 
international relations as 
main interest
22%
Educational
16%
Professional
11%Women's organizations
10%
Miscellaneous and 
unidentified
11%Agricultural
0%Labor
2%
Religious
5%
Civic
6%
Business
8%
Social and fraternal
9%
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APPENDIX D
Distribution of Publications
(Compiled from State Department Opinion Reports, April 1945)
APPENDIX E
Private Organizations Represented by Consultants at the United Nations Conference on International Organization 
San Francisco, April-June 1945
(Source: Dept. of State Press Release No. 323. 10 April 1945)
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PUBLICATIONS
Local Organizations
National Organizations
Government Agencies
1,369,609
434,631
260,323
112,831
American Association for the United Nations 
American Association of University Women 
American Bar Association 
American Council on Education 
American Farm Bureau Federation 
American Federation of Labor
American Jewish Committee
American Jewish Conference 
American Legion
American Section, International Chamber of Commerce
Americans Veterans Committee
Americans United for World Organization, Inc.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Catholic Association for International Peace
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.
Church Peace Union
Congress of Industrial Organizations
Council on Foreign Relations
Disabled American Veterans of World War II
Farmers Union
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America
Foreign Policy Association
General Federation of Women's Clubs
Kiwanis International Lions International
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
National Association of Manufacturers
National Catholic Welfare Conference
National Congress of Parents and Teachers
National Council of Farmer Cooperatives
National Education Association
National Exchange Clubs
National Federation of Business and Professional Women's
Clubs, Inc.
National Foreign Trade Council
National Grange
National Lawyers Guild
National League of Women Voters
National Peace Conference 
Railway Labor Executives Association Rotary International
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S.
Women's Action Committee for Victory and Lasting Peace
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The research and writing for this case was made possible by the Center for Public Leadership and the Carr Center
for Human Rights Policy. The authors want to thank Lauren Schuker and Calvin Kung for their important con-
tributions to the research for this project. Mr. Kung’s work in compiling the bibliography and appendices makes
the case study a valuable resource for both students and researchers.
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ENDNOTES
1 This volume, unlike the subsequent series entitled Foreign Relations of the United States, is written as a narrative
with very few footnotes.  It contains select documents in the annex, but the volume rarely mentions the government
documents that inform the narrative.
2 The addition of China and France as permanent member of the U.N. Security Council was something of an after-
thought. The Soviet Union was so opposed to China’s participation in the creation of the U.N. that it refused to meet
with Chinese delegates at Dumbarton Oaks. Following the Yalta Summit of Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill in
February 1945, France was invited to become a sponsoring member of the San Francisco Conference but declined.
Delegates from China and France only became active in Charter drafting at San Francisco.
3 Given its reference in a concluding section to the creation of the Division of Public Liaison, this memo was most
likely prepared in early February 1944. The Doris Cochrane files, named after a member of the Public Liaison Division,
include valuable memos, letters, reports, printed materials, and press releases relating to the U.N. campaign.
4 By Department order, Dickey was designated a Special Consultant "with such duties as may be assigned to him by
the Secretary" (U.S. State Department. 1943. Bulletin. Vol. IX:  6).
5 The American Association for the United Nations later changed its name to Americans United for the United
Nations, and then to the Americans United for World Government. In 1946, it merged itself with the United World
Federalists.
6 AUWO was formed by the merger of six political action organizations and collaborated with 18 others. The big six
were: American Free World Association; Citizens for Victory; Committee to Defend America; Fight for Freedom;
United Nations Association; and United Nations Committee for Greater New York. The other 18 organizations are
listed in Appendix A.
7 Appendix B lists all the organizations represented at the 16 October 1944 meeting. Appendix C consists of a pie
graph that breaks down meeting participation according to organization type.
8 The meetings were held on 20 October, 03 November, 17 November, and 27 December 1944.
9 Of these speaking engagements, 200 were filled in the East, 48 in the South and Southwest, 58 in the Midwest,
and 23 in the Far West.
10 The bar graph in Appendix D breaks down the distribution of these publications according to publication and type
of organization targeted. The table does not include newspaper mats distributed through the Office of War
Information to weekly and rural press. By April 1945, the State Department estimated that at least 30 percent of
the larger papers in the country had published these mats.
11 The organizations represented in this group are listed in Appendix E.
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